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Credit Booms and Busts in the Caribbean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Since 1970, private sector credit has grown quite rapidly in the Caribbean. More recently, 
between 2004 and 2006, total real credit in the Caribbean has risen by a cumulative 55.7 percent, 
or approximately 19 percent per annum.  In some countries, the rate of expansion has even been 
stronger, which is of concern given the likely negative macroeconomic consequences of credit 
booms.  This paper attempts to identify the factors that have led to credit booms and conversely 
busts in the Caribbean, employing annual data for 13 Caribbean countries covering the period 
1970 to 2006 in the analysis.  This study employs a panel count data regression approach. Three 
key groups of variables are considered: (1) macroeconomic developments; (2) macroeconomic 
policy, and (3) external shocks.  The reported results suggest that macroeconomic developments 
were the main determinants of credit booms in the Caribbean, with low inflation, high growth in 
GDP per capita, investment booms as well as less developed financial systems leading to the 
emergence of credit booms and conversely for busts.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial system fulfils five key roles in any economy: (1) reduces risk; (2) allocates 
resources; (3) monitors and exerts control over managers; (4) mobilise savings, and; (5) facilitates 
the exchange of goods and services (Levine, 1997).  Indeed, King and Levine (1993), using the 
ratio of commercial bank paper to central bank credit to measure the degree of financial 
development found that financial development was positively correlated with economic growth.   
 
An inadequate supply of credit to the private sector can therefore constrain the long-run growth 
prospects for any economy.  At the same, however, too much credit can be equally damaging.  A 
credit boom, described as an episode of sharp and above trend expansion in real credit, is usually 
associated with greater investment in risky assets and above trend private consumption 
expenditure growth. These two factors often contribute to inflationary pressures, increased 
financial sector fragility and at the limit a balance of payments and/or financial crisis.     
 
There is considerable evidence identifying lending booms as a frequent cause of banking and 
currency crises (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Borio and Lowe, 2002).  Kaminsky, Lizondo, and 
Reinhart (1997), in a survey of the literature, reported that five out of seven studies identified 
credit growth to be an important determinant of banking and/or currency crises.  According to 
Borio and Lowe (2002), one of the relatively few robust findings to emerge from the literature on 
leading indicators of banking crisis is that rapid domestic credit growth increases the likelihood 
of a problem.  Similarly, IMF (2004) concluded that credit booms posed significant risks for 
emerging market countries, as they are generally followed by sharp economic downturns and 
financial crises.  In a broad sample of boom episodes over forty years, lending booms were found 
to be associated with a domestic investment boom, an increase in domestic interest rates, a 
worsening of the current account, a decline in international reserves, a real appreciation of the 
exchange rate, and a fall in growth of potential output.  About three-fourths of credit booms were 
found to be associated with a banking crisis and almost seven-eighths with a currency crisis 
(IMF, 2004).  
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Hilber et al (2005) also reported that lending booms are accompanied by a sharp deterioration in 
the trade balance and current account balance in the crisis countries.  Similar trends were 
observed in Central and Eastern European countries as well as countries to the East and South of 
the European Union (referred to as CEE) where the current account deficit also widened sharply 
(Hilber et al, 2005).  Hilber et al (2005) deduced that the rapid expansion in bank credit seemed 
to be associated with high current account deficits in most of the CEE countries.   
 
Although a prolonged period of above trend growth in credit can be linked to the increased risk of 
banking and currency crisis, at the same time the importance of credit in the growth dynamic 
cannot be ignored.  This trade-off often poses a dilemma for policymakers (Kraft and Jankov, 
2004).  Policymakers in the Caribbean are especially challenged as they seek to stimulate 
economic activity and engender growth and sustainable development with limited resources and 
heighten vulnerability to external shocks.  Balancing the potential risks associated with credit 
booms against the gains requires an understanding of the main determinants of credit.   
 
This study outlines the main drivers of credit boom episodes over the last thirty years in the 
Caribbean.  A credit bust is the converse of a credit boom and is expected to arise from opposite 
forces and so the investigation focuses on the boom episode.  The findings presented in this paper 
should help policymakers understand the conditions under which credit booms are likely to 
emerge as well as the policies that could be employed to address the problem. The paper also 
contributes to the existing literature by: (1) providing a review of credit trends in the Caribbean 
over the last 30 years; (2) providing a framework for identifying booms, and; (3) examining the 
role of policy as well as external shocks to the emergence of credit booms.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on credit booms, while section 3 provides a review and analysis of credit trends in the 
Caribbean between 1970 and 2007.  Section 4 presents the methodology for identifying credit 
boom episodes and outlines the empirical approach employed to evaluate the determinants of 
credit booms.  Section 5 provides the empirical results, while section 6 gives a summary of the 
results as well as policy recommendations.  
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2. Why do Credit Booms or Busts Occur?  
During the development phase of an economy, credit grows more quickly than output (Favara, 
2003; King and Levine, 1993; and Levine, 1997).  This “financial deepening” argument is 
supported by empirical work suggesting that a more developed financial sector helps promote 
economic growth.  Another observation is that credit expands more rapidly than output at the 
beginning of a cyclical upturn due to firms’ investment and working capital needs, according to 
the conventional accelerator models (see, e.g., Fuerst, 1995; and International Monetary Fund, 
2004a).  In addition, excessive credit expansions may result from inappropriate responses by 
financial market participant to changes in risks over time.  In practice, it has proven difficult to 
distinguish among these three factors driving credit growth and to determine a “neutral” level or 
rate of growth for credit.   
 
The risks associated with excessive credit expansions are generally underestimated due to 
measurement difficulties both in forecasting overall economic activity and its link with credit 
losses, and in assessing how correlations of credit losses across borrowers and lenders change 
over time (Hilber et al, 2005). This under-estimation of risk may result in over optimism about 
the degree of structural change that may be fueling the credit growth and a socially suboptimal 
reaction to risk by market participants.  Incentives structures that reward short-term performance 
further contribute to credit growth even if risks are measured properly.  Certain accounting and 
regulatory frameworks may create incentives for banks to take on excessive risk, including moral 
hazard arising from implicit or explicit government guarantees or inappropriate governance 
structures. 
 
Credit expansion can be viewed as a symptom of financial development, in particular financial 
deepening, as noted in the literature on the finance-growth nexus. Financial development, 
fostered by technical change that has reduced the cost of acquiring, processing and storing 
information is also a factor.  According to the literature, financial liberalisation and capital flows 
triggered by external factors or wealth shocks originating from comprehensive structural reforms 
can also contribute to excessive credit expansion.  Equally important in stimulating the growth of 
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credit is the continuous opening-up of these economies to international financial flows.  This 
facilitates access to foreign funds as an additional source of refinancing banks credit action.  Less 
than fully credible policies, in particular exchange rate-based stabilisations can play a role in 
stimulating credit booms by setting off a consumption boom.  Backe and Wojcik (2008) found a 
link between the expansion in credit and macroeconomic stabilisation and a build up of 
confidence in policy frameworks that provide lower inflation and, thus, declining interest rates 
drawing on the experience of the new Central and Eastern European EU member states. 
Privatisation and restructuring of the banking sector together with regulatory reforms of the 
financial markets that have promoted private savings as a source of banks’ financing can 
therefore facilitate credit expansion. Improvements of legal frameworks, by reducing risk of 
banks’ activities, were found to positively influence the supply of credit (Backe and Wojcik, 
2008). Increased competition stimulated the development of new products.   
 
Backe and Wojcik (2008) study also found that supply and demand factors were closely 
interrelated.  They focused on the demand-side phenomenon, albeit one which is set off by a 
supply side shock.  In particular, they emphasized the role of consumption smoothing in response 
to a productivity shock as an important channel of the observed credit expansion. Hilbers et al 
(2005) in reviewing the credit boom episodes of CEE argued that low initial credit-to-GDP ratios 
reflected the underdeveloped nature of domestic financial sector at the beginning of the transition.   
 
 
The literature on credit in the Caribbean is relatively sparse.   Bourne (1984), Worrell (1983) and 
Ramkissoon (1988) analysed various aspects of the loans market.  These efforts include a number 
of alternative specifications and variables.  Ramkissoon (1988) specified both a loan demand and 
supply schedule for business which incorporated variables such as the supply of business loans, 
the weighted average loan rate, the weighted average rate on treasury bills and other special 
deposits and the average bank deposits on the supply side.  On the demand side he considered 
operating surplus, the weighted average loan rate and gross domestic product at current prices. 
The results were consistent with other studies that the weighted average loan rate was statistically 
insignificant.  Other studies of the demand for credit have included the following variables: 
expected price level, current dollar permanent income, current dollar transitory income, expected 
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rate of inflation, nominal interest rate.  On the supply side the following variables have been 
considered: scale constraint, interest rate on commercial bank loans, opportunity cost of lending 
for commercial banks and cost per dollar of bank deposits. 
 
Downes et al (1997) examined the demand function for private individual credit in Barbados, in 
which they argued that demand was the key determinant with supply adjusting to meet 
households’ requirements and the interest rate on consumer credit set exogenously according to 
the base rate of the commercial banks rather than the interaction of supply and demand for credit.  
Demand was postulated to depend on disposable income, liquid assets, nominal base interest rate, 
inflation and government policy on credit.  The findings were similar with nominal interest rate 
being found not to influence private consumer credit, at least not in the short run.  
 
3. The Development of Credit Markets in the Sample Countries 
 
Prior to the start of our sample, there existed a British Caribbean Currency Board, which 
governed monetary and exchange rate policy in the Anglophone Caribbean, a grouping of which 
included all of our sample countries. Concurrently, many of the same banks operated in most 
territories, leading to a fairly integrated banking sector. The 1960s signalled the end of 
colonisation within the larger economies so that by the 1970s (when the smaller economies 
gained their independence) there were five central banks in operation and, by the 1980s, there 
were eight central banks
2
. These fledging institutions were patterned for the most part after their 
British and European counterparts, a consequence of their colonial heritage, but evolved to suit 
their various economies over time.  
 
Despite their somewhat similar beginnings, however, monetary and exchange rate policy in these 
territories started to diverge. By the end of 2007, the fixed exchange rate system that had 
dominated the region during British rule was systematically moving towards a floating rate 
system, though some countries still opted to peg their currency to that of a larger economy
3
. In 
                                                 
2
 The OECS countries are a special case, as they have one central bank – the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank – 
though most were independent nations. 
3
 Those countries with fixed exchange rate regimes within our sample are pegged to the US dollar. 
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addition, some islands had significantly fewer controls over financial flows than others, leading to 
different rates of development of their banking and overall financial sectors.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Financial Systems 
(As at December 2007) 
Countries 
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Bahamas    
Barbados     
Belize    
ECCU    
      Antigua & Barbuda    
      Dominica    
      Grenada    
      St. Kitts & Nevis    
      St. Lucia    
      St. Vincent & the Grenadines    
Guyana    
Jamaica    
Suriname    
Trinidad & Tobago    
Total     
Sources: Various IMF Country Reports, Various Central Banks 
 
 
In line with the move towards increased sovereignty, the regional financial sector that had 
developed pre-independence came under threat with the concomitant surge in nationalist 
sentiment. Some of the foreign commercial banks were being phased out, either through 
voluntary exit or nationalisation by governments, one of the repercussions of which was that the 
financial sector primarily served political interests and was hampered in terms of determining its 
own direction. These newly developed national financial sectors, however, proved attractive for 
foreign investors and some countries, such as Barbados, the Bahamas and a few of the OECS 
countries, started to host a growing offshore banking sector.  
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From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, these fragile economies buckled under the strain, 
experiencing extreme economic hardships that forced the implementation of structural adjustment 
and stabilisation programmes. Guyana, Jamaica, Barbados, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago 
all endured these efforts to re-orient their economies towards a free market with minimal 
government intervention. The concurrent liberalisation of the financial system boded well for the 
banking sector, which benefited from a relaxation in exchange controls and a general easing of 
tight financial regulations. In general, therefore, over the period 1970-2007, there was a 
significant deepening of the financial sector, as the banks expanded and increased the efficiency 
of their operations. In addition, this period saw regional integration creep to the forefront of 
policy once again, which helped to encourage many of the banks to widen their operations across 
territories. This concentration across countries suggests that there would be similar lending 
practices, even though institutions would obviously adapt their strategies to suit each individual 
territory. In addition, their operations could lead to similar responses across countries to monetary 
policy and economic developments.  
 
The blossoming of the banking sector fostered an environment that encouraged the development 
of competition in the form of non-bank financial institutions. At the start of our sample period, 
the ratio of bank assets to total financial system assets was roughly 80%, however, by 2007, this 
ratio had fallen to 63.5%, reflecting the deepening and broadening of the financial systems across 
the region. Although banks are still the major players in consumer and commercial lending, as 
well as being an important supplier of credit to government, these non-bank institutions are 
playing a greater role in financing the economic development of their respective territories. Stock 
markets are becoming increasingly acknowledged as a source of commercial credit since their 
birth in the region in the 1980s, while, with respect to consumer lending, there is a wider range of 
options, including credit unions, mortgage finance institutions, building societies and insurance 
companies, to a lesser extent. Credit unions in particular have been steadily increasing their 
market presence though, in general, they have yet to present any meaningful competition to 
commercial banks. Given the sustained, though weakened, dominance of the banking sector, our 
study focuses on the credit extended by commercial banks.  
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4.  Identifying Credit Booms 
This section of the study outlines the approaches that will be employed to identify credit booms 
in thirteen English-speaking Caribbean countries.  A credit boom is defined as a period of above 
average growth in credit and is identified through the deviation of credit growth from its 
historical trend.  The first step in the process of identifying credit booms is therefore to estimate 
trend credit growth for each country in the sample.  The moving-average approach calculates 
trend credit growth as the nine-month moving average of credit growth.  In the second step of the 
process, trough dates are identified as points in time when trend credit growth is lower than in the 
preceding and succeeding six months, while peak dates are those periods when trend credit 
growth is higher than in the preceding and succeeding six months.  An episode is then defined as 
a period over which trend credit growth rises by at least 5 percent from trough to peak. 
 
One of the drawbacks of the approach discussed above is that booms and busts are identified 
through a somewhat ad hoc process.  To overcome this shortcoming, the boom and bust cycle of 
Caribbean credit growth is modelled using a Markov switching vector autoregressive model.  The 
stochastic process of the growth in credit is assumed to follow an autoregressive specification of 
order k: 
 

 
k
i
titkttk ysvy
1
)(                       (1) 
Where v  is the regime-dependent intercept, ts  is the regime index,   are the coefficients  on the 
autoregressive terms, and t  is a sequence of )1,0(.. Ndii  random variables.  By allowing the 
intercept to depend on the cycle, the model implicitly assumes a smooth transition from one state 
to the next.   
 
Following Hamilton (1989), the state variable, ts , is represented as an unobserved discrete-time, 
discrete-state Markov process.  The transition probability matrix is such that: 
 

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N
j
ijttij iallforPwithisjsP
0
1 1]|Pr[ .           (2) 
Maximum likelihood estimation of the framework given in Equation (1) is undertaken using the 
Expectation Maximization algorithm discussed in Hamilton (1990).  In addition, the smoothing 
algorithm of Kim (1994) is employed to assign probabilities to the unobserved state conditional 
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on the information set.  The three-regime version of Equation (1) is applied to monthly credit 
growth for each Caribbean country.  The three-regime framework assumes that credit growth 
evolves through a stochastic process of busts, moderate growth and booms.   
 
Figure 1 plots the number countries experiencing a credit boom during a particular year.  The 
figure suggests that there was a concentration of credit booms in the late 1980s and mid-1990s. It 
also indicates that since 2005, a larger number of countries have been experiencing credit booms.   
 
Figure 1: Credit Booms in the Caribbean 
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 Source: Author’s calculations 
 
To remove the effects of business cycle fluctuations, the database was averaged over five-year 
intervals.  As a result, the study employs a panel count data specification to empirically model 
credit booms.  It is common to assume a Poisson distribution for the number of occurrences of an 
event: 
Pr[ ] , 0,1,2,...
!
i iy
i
e
Y y y
y
 
                 (1) 
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Where   is the intensity parameter and y  are the number of events occurring during a particular 
period.  The intensity is then explained by K  linearly independent covariates: 
 'exp( ), 1,...,i ix i N                   (2) 
The Poisson regression is derived under the assumption of mean and variance equality.  If this is 
not the case, i.e. over dispersion, then one can utilise the negative Binomial model (see Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005).  The model is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood using the 
Bendt-Hall-Hausman algorithm (other algorithms, such as Quadratic-Hill Climbing and Newton-
Raphson, were employed, but these yielded similar estimation results).   
 
5. Factors Influencing the Emergence of Credit Booms or Busts 
 
During the episodes of rapid credit growth, patterns have emerged in key macroeconomic and 
financial variables and, drawing on the previous empirical work summarised in Section 2, the 
following influences on the emergence of credit booms in developing countries have been 
identified for consideration in this study: (1) macroeconomic developments (inflation, GDP per 
capita growth, gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP and financial development); 
(2) macroeconomic policy (government consumption as a percentage of GDP, reserve 
requirements, interest rate changes, sterilisation operations/exchange rate interventions); (3) 
external shocks (world growth, capital inflows, changes in the terms of trade and elections); and, 
(4) financial indicators (capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loans to total loans, 
loans/deposits, deposits as a percentage of GDP, funding of credit booms) 
 
5.1  Macroeconomic Developments 
Macroeconomic developments should be expected to be one of the key determinants of the 
emergence of credit booms in the developing economies of the Caribbean, since they impact on 
both the demand for credit on the part of the private sector, as well as the willingness to lend on 
the part of the banking industry. Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of key macroeconomic indicators 
at the start, peak and end of the credit boom episodes identified in the previous section. 
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Developments during Credit Booms 
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Figure 2 clearly shows that, on average, inflationary pressures eased during the credit booms but 
shoots up thereafter. As inflation reduces the real value of amounts repaid by borrowers as well as 
increases uncertainty, it should be expected to be inversely correlated with the emergence of 
credit booms.  The charts of real GDP growth and growth in GDP per capita, on the other hand, 
show the reverse, where during credit booms, economic activity expands at a faster rate than pre- 
or post-boom. According to the financial accelerator model, credit should be expected to rise 
faster at the beginning of a cyclical upturn due to firms’ investment and working capital needs 
(see, e.g., Fuerst, 1995; and International Monetary Fund, 2004a).  To capture this effect, the 
regression equation includes the difference between growth in GDP per capita and trend growth.   
 
The ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP, taken as a measure of investment activity, 
attempts to capture the effects of investment booms.  A credit boom, therefore, may be a sign of 
an investment boom and this appears to be the case when considering the gross fixed capital 
formation to GDP chart. Moreover, the decline in the ratios of household consumption-to-GDP 
and government consumption-to-GDP, as shown in Figure 2, provide further evidence that this 
may be the case given that if there is no investment boom lending may be aimed more at 
households or government.  Since most finance for investment in the Caribbean either comes 
from internal sources or commercial banks (Craigwell, Maxwell and Moore, 2005), investment 
booms are expected to be positively correlated with the emergence of credit booms.   
 
Financial development, fostered by technical change that has reduced the cost of acquiring, 
processing and storing information can facilitate more arms’ length transactions as well as allow 
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broader participation.  This encourages an expansion in both the variety of intermediaries as well 
as the number of financial transactions (Love, 2003; Blackburn and Hung, 1998).  The wider 
variety of financial intermediaries should result in a reduction in the dependence of the private 
sector on bank finance; however, the history of these markets shows that the ratio of bank real 
credit to the private sector (BRCPS)-to-GDP rose from an average – excluding Suriname and 
Jamaica
4
 – of 57.9% in 1971 to 95.5% in 2007. Furthermore, when considering total deposits-to-
GDP, there has been a significant increase over the sample period, from an average
5
 of 24.3% in 
1979 to 128.9% in 2007, and this suggests development within the financial sector as market 
participants increasingly utilise financial instruments for savings. Although there is a clear 
indication of the continued dominance of the banking industry, there is no doubt that there has 
been substantial development within the financial sectors of the sample countries. As a result, the 
relationship between financial development, proxied by the ratio of M2 to GDP, and credit booms 
is expected to be inversely related to the emergence of credit booms.   
 
One feature of the economies of the sample countries is that most of them are net importers, some 
to the extent that more than 75% of their consumption is imported. This leads to a situation where 
credit booms inevitably lead to worsening external current account positions, as shown in the 
current account to GDP chart in Figure 2. In fact, it is this relationship that often forces central 
bank intervention in the fixed exchange rate regimes of our sample in order to protect the net 
international reserves of the country in question.  
 
 
5.2.  Macroeconomic Policy 
Rather than macroeconomic developments, it is also possible that the activities of policymakers 
may directly or indirectly influence the emergence of credit booms.  As such, we shall consider 
the behaviour of monetary, fiscal and trade policy indicators (see Figure 3). 
 
                                                 
4
 This average excludes Suriname and Jamaica. Due to exchange rate challenges, the ratio of bank credit-to-GDP 
when expressed in real terms for Suriname and Jamaica are exceptionally high, though they had fallen over the 
sample period, and including these ratios significantly distorts the average across the region.  
5
 This average excludes Suriname. 
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Figure 3: Macroeconomic Policy during Credit Booms 
7.5
7.6
7.6
7.7
7.7
7.8
7.8
7.9
Average Deposit Rates
%
Start Peak End
14.0
14.0
14.1
14.1
14.1
14.1
14.1
14.2
14.2
14.2
14.2
Average Lending Rates
%
Start Peak End
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
6.0
Interest Rate Spread
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 P
o
in
ts
Start Peak End
7.8
8.0
8.2
8.4
8.6
8.8
9.0
9.2
9.4
9.6
Percentage Change in Money Supply
%
Start Peak End
 16 
1.262
1.264
1.266
1.268
1.270
1.272
1.274
1.276
1.278
Index of Trade Openness
Start Peak End
19.2
19.4
19.6
19.8
20.0
20.2
20.4
20.6
20.8
Government Consumption/GDP
%
Start Peak End
-0.110
-0.105
-0.100
-0.095
-0.090
-0.085
-0.080
Index of Capital Account Openness
Start Peak End
 
With respect to monetary policy, in most Caribbean countries, policy makers either directly or 
indirectly attempt to influence interest rates.  Relative high interest rates can increase the cost of 
borrowing and suffocate private sector investment.  However, relatively low interest rates can 
make projects with relatively low returns seem more attractive and encourage speculation to earn 
higher returns.  Three indicators of interest rate rates are therefore examined in this study: (1) 
deposit rates; (2) lending rates, and; (3) interest rate spreads.  Figure 3 shows the behaviour of 
interest rates prior to, during and immediately following credit booms. The graph indicates that 
prior to credit booms, a low interest rate regime prevailed and it is possible that this favourable 
borrowing environment encouraged the development of episodes of rapid credit growth. As the 
boom takes hold, rates start to rise, probably due to central bank intervention so that by the end of 
the boom period, rates are noticeably higher than pre-boom. Another interesting pattern is the 
widening of the spread between deposit and lending rates during credit booms. At the beginning 
of the boom, interest rate spreads are smaller but gradually rise throughout the episode. This 
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could once again be due to central bank intervention, which tends to translate into faster lending 
rate adjustment relative to that of deposit rates.  
 
As an alternative indicator of monetary policy, changes in liquid money (M1) was considered, as 
the central banks may attempt to influence money supply through changes in base money.  An 
increase in the money supply may suggest that the central bank is maintaining an expansionary 
policy stance and could therefore encourage banks to expand their loan portfolios.   
 
In terms of fiscal policy, government consumption is employed as a measure of government’s 
fiscal policy stance and, as shown in Figure 3, government consumption-to-GDP tends to rise 
during credit booms. However, a priori, it has an ambiguous impact on the emergence of credit 
booms.  If government finances its spending through money creation this could increase bank 
liquidity and create the conditions for a credit boom.  On the other hand, if spending is financed 
via government paper, this can reduce the supply of funds for private investment.   
 
The removal (or weakening) of controls on trade as well as financial flows are also ambiguously 
associated with the emergence of a boom.  Figure 3 suggests that trade openness is at its highest 
during credit booms but is relatively restricted pre- and post-boom. Greater trade openness could 
provide larger markets for exporters (Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall, 2004) and therefore greater 
demand for credit.  However, if trade liberalisation leads to increased uncertainty, financial 
institutions could be less willing to lend (particularly to those companies that could be severely 
affected due to the removal of protection).   
 
Similarly, opening the capital account should provide domestic firms greater options, in terms of 
financing their activities and should thus reduce the dependence on domestic finance.  On the 
other hand, if the removal of controls on capital flows leads to greater capital inflows, this could 
drive up liquidity and result in a domestic credit boom (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). With 
respect to capital account liberalisation, Figure 3 suggests that capital account restrictions are at 
their most stringent during credit booms. It is possible, therefore, that the more relaxed stance 
prior to the boom could have encouraged inflows that helped spur high credit growth. Following 
the onset of the boom, policy makers may have tightened restrictions to mitigate any unwanted 
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impact on exchange rates and/or reserves. In fact, the financial account-to-GDP chart in Figure 4 
suggests that financial inflows grew despite relatively tighter controls, implying that the 
favourable conditions that prevailed pre-boom were sufficient incentive for sustained capital 
flows, even after the actions of policy makers. 
 
 
5.3  Political Cycles and External Shocks 
Due to the vulnerability of Caribbean economies to external shocks (see Easterly and Kraay, 
2000), the third group of variables considered attempt to capture the effects of external shocks on 
the likely emergence of credit booms.  Four potential external factors are considered: (1) world 
growth; (2) capital inflows; (3) changes in the terms of trade; and, (4) elections.   
 
Most Caribbean economies depend on the export of primary commodities or tourism services to 
propel growth.  These activities are largely driven by income fluctuations (world growth) in key 
source markets and prices (terms of trade).  Positive shocks to world income and the terms of 
trade are therefore expected to be positively associated with the emergence of credit booms. 
Figure 4 supports this expectation, clearly showing that prior to and during credit booms, growth 
in real world GDP is noticeably higher than immediately following the boom and that there are 
improvements in the terms of trade over the duration of the boom. Capital inflows eventually 
filter into the financial system, as noted in the financial account/GDP chart in Figure 4, and could 
therefore finance a significant expansion in credit.   
 
With respect to elections, in an attempt to obtain a favourable outcome, incumbent governments 
may engage in some degree of pre-election spending.  This could, depending on the source of 
finance, provide the conditions for the emergence of credit booms (Nordhaus, 1975).  The 
elections chart in Figure 4 shows the total number of elections that took place before, during and 
after elections for all sample countries over the period 1970-2007, and shows a slight rise in the 
number of elections during booms. 
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Figure 4: Political Cycles and External Shocks during Credit Booms  
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5.4  Financial Sector Indicators 
The final set of indicators are not included in the regression to determine the causes of credit 
booms because of insufficient time series, but they warrant discussion because they provide of 
good description of developments within the financial sector during credit booms and some of the 
indicators, such as the prudential measures, could influence the emergence of credit booms. 
These are summarised in Table 2 and Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Financial Sector Indicators during Credit Booms 
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One of the key indicators of the health of the banking sector is the capital adequacy ratio, which 
is a measure of the capital buffer of the banks should there be a significant negative event. Figure 
5 shows that during booms, the capital adequacy ratio falls and continues to decline following the 
boom. This implies that the capital buffer of banks is eroded somewhat after a credit boom and 
the recovery is not immediate. A similar pattern is also observed for non-performing loans to total 
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loans and this implies that the loan quality improves during a credit boom, probably due to an 
increased ability to repay on the part of borrowers.  
 
Commercial bank credit in most countries was generally funded through the deposit base; 
however, as illustrated in Figure 5, prior to the onset of a credit boom, there appears to be a trend 
where there are noticeable inflows reflected in the commercial banks’ net foreign assets (NFA). 
This is in line with the assumption that capital inflows could lead to rapid credit growth.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Banking Systems of Selected Countries 
(As at December 2007, unless stated otherwise) 
Countries 
Banking 
Assets/ 
Total 
Financial 
System 
Assets 
(%) 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Ratio 
(CAR) 
(%) 
NPL/ 
Total 
Loans 
(%) 
Share of 
Loans to 
Businesses  
(%) 
Share of 
Loans to 
Households 
(%) 
Share 
of FX 
Loans 
(%) 
Maturity 
of Loans
1 
(%) 
Loans to 
Deposits 
(%) 
Bahamas -- 33.9
a
 4.2
a
 -- 70.5 11.2 83.0 115.3 
Barbados  65.8
a
 44.3 3.3 39.2 47.7 9.5 73.9 63.7 
Belize -- 10.5 8.7 61.7 23.5 49.6 -- 98.0 
ECCU -- 24.3 7.2 36.8 41.8 -- 81.0 81.2 
      Antigua & Barbuda -- -- -- 38.0 42.7 -- 79.9 73.7 
      Dominica -- 16.4 8.4 29.7 57.0 -- 84.0 63.9 
      Grenada -- -- -- 30.8 54.7 -- 82.9 81.0 
      St. Kitts & Nevis -- 38.9
a
 4.8
a
 22.9 31.4 -- 72.7 49.3 
      St. Lucia -- 17.6
a
 8.5
a
 53.6 33.9 -- 82.2 122.0 
      St. Vincent & the Grenadines -- -- -- 29.5 45.7 -- 84.2 82.0 
Guyana 61.6 15.3 11.5 63.4 32.7 -- 46.3 50.4 
Jamaica 65.3 16.1 2.2 60.2 37.8 40.8 -- 64.8 
Suriname -- -- 11.5 -- -- -- -- 54.3 
Trinidad & Tobago 72.9
c
 21.4
b
 2.3
b
 48.1 41.0 -- 46.7 84.2 
Average 63.5 20.5 7.6 43.4 43.2 27.8 73.6 77.1 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, Various IMF Country Reports, Various Central Banks, Authors’ calculations 
Explanation: NPL=Non-performing loans; FX=Foreign exchange 
1 Long terms loans divided by total loans 
a End of 2006 
b End of 2005 
c Total Banking Assets as a percentage of Total Assets of Deposit-Taking Financial Institutions 
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6. Empirical Approach and Results 
6.1 Macroeconomic Developments 
Table 3 provides the coefficient estimates for the basic econometric model that only includes 
variables that capture macroeconomic developments. Before analysing the coefficient estimates, 
an analysis of the test statistics is provided.  The model was first estimated using Poisson 
estimation, however, a test for over dispersion (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) rejected the 
Poisson restriction.  As a result, the model was estimated using the negative Binomial count 
model.  A test for the significance of the fixed-effects had a chi-square value of 21.088[0.049], 
suggests that the null hypothesis that the fixed-effects can be restricted to zero could not be 
accepted at normal levels of testing.  The Jarque-Bera statistic, which tests the null hypothesis 
that the residuals are normally distributed, is 0.377 (p-value = 0.828) for the model with fixed 
effects and 4.835 (p-value = 0.089), for the model without fixed effects, suggesting that the null 
hypothesis can not be rejected at normal levels of testing for the model with fixed effects.   
 
Turning now to the coefficient estimates, Table 3 provides the coefficient estimates from two 
model specifications: one with fixed effects and the other without fixed effects (i.e. assuming that 
the intercept does not vary across countries).  In addition, the dependent variable, credit booms is 
generated using the trend approach as well as the Markov switching technique.  Given the joint 
significance of the fixed effects alluded to above, the model without fixed effects is only provided 
for comparison purposes.  In addition, the main findings from employing the trend and Markov 
switching techniques were quite similar.  Consequently, the coefficient estimates obtained from 
using the trend approach to identifying booms is employed in the rest of the study.  The four main 
indicators or macroeconomic development are all significant at normal levels of testing.  In 
agreement with a priori expectations, inflation had a negative and statistically significant impact 
on the emergence of credit booms.  High inflation, due to effects on uncertainty and the real value 
of money seem to have a disincentive effect on the willingness to lend in the Caribbean and 
therefore reduce the likelihood of a credit boom emerging.   
 
The coefficients on the growth rate of GDP per capita and investment as a ratio of GDP are both 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that booms in the Caribbean are more likely to 
occur when GDP growth accelerates and/or due to a pick-up in investment activity.  The negative 
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coefficient on the financial development seems to suggest that as the financial market in the 
Caribbean developments, households and firms seem to seek other sources of funds to finance 
their transactions.  This finding needs to conditioned, however, as shifting financial activities 
from highly regulated industries (banks) to less well regulated financial companies may have 
implications for the stability of the financial system. 
 
Table 3: The Impact of Macroeconomic Developments on the Emergence of Credit Booms 
 Dependent Variable = Credit 
Booms (Trend Approach) 
 Dependent Variable = Credit Booms 
(Markov Switching Approach) 
Variable (without fixed 
effects) 
(with fixed 
effects) 
 (without fixed 
effects) 
(with fixed 
effects) 
Constant 0.437 
(1.487) 
-0.145 
(-0.359) 
 -0.037 
(-0.109) 
0.233 
(0.608) 
tInflation  
-3.528 
(-0.914) 
-8.330 
(-2.035)** 
 -13.091 
(-2.191)** 
-15.514 
(-2.994)** 
tcapitaperGDPinGrowth  
1.652 
(0.579) 
5.875 
(3.103)* 
 9.906 
(1.997)* 
14.163 
(3.364)** 
tInvestment  
0.015 
(2.945)** 
0.022 
(3.262)** 
 -0.003 
(-0.253) 
-0.027 
(-0.238) 
tGDPM 2  
-0.006 
(2.109)** 
-0.007 
(-2.126)** 
 0.001 
(0.295) 
0.001 
(0.912) 
      
Log-Likelihood -165.205 -162.202  -135.307 -133.813 
R-squared 0.078 0.107  0.088 0.283 
Number of Observations 96 96  96 96 
Note: (1) z-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
(2) ** and * indicates significance at the 5 and 10 percent level of testing, respectively 
 
6.2  Macroeconomic Policy and Credit Booms 
Rather than macroeconomic developments, it is also possible that the activities of policymakers 
may directly or indirectly influence the emergence of credit booms.  Table 4 therefore augments 
the basic model of credit booms with various indicators of policy shocks.  Three interest rate 
variables are considered: the lending rate, the deposit rate and the interest rate spread.  All the 
interest rate variables were, however, insignificant determinants of credit booms in the region.  
One possible explanation for this finding is that central banks in the region, in one way or the 
other, have attempted to affect domestic interest rates.  If interest rates are not market determined, 
the emergence of credit booms is therefore less likely, since policymakers are unlikely to let such 
a bubble emerge.  Changes in the money supply, a more conventional indicator of monetary 
policy intervention, in contrast, were positive and statistically significant at normal levels of 
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testing.  The significance of this variable indicates that positive money supply shocks could, in 
some instances, lead to the formation of credit booms. 
 
Government consumption, an indicator of government’s fiscal policy stance, was insignificant at 
normal levels of testing.  While this finding would suggest that fiscal policy interventions are not 
as important as monetary policy changes in the emergence of credit booms, it could also be due to 
other factors: (1) government consumption may be a poor indicator of government’s fiscal policy 
stance, or; (2) the positive effect of government spending may be off-setting its crowding-out 
effect.   
 
Trade openness, a proxy for the level of protection being offered to domestic firms, was also 
insignificant at normal levels of testing.  As most Caribbean countries rely on the export of 
services or primary commodities to protected markets, the removal of trade restrictions is 
unlikely to trigger an expansion in the demand for these goods, since demand would primarily be 
driven by demand in source markets.  In contrast, the removal of controls on the flows of capital 
across borders had a positive and statistically significant impact on the emergence of credit 
booms.  This could suggest that opening the capital account in the Caribbean boosts capital flows 
and thereby finances the emergence of credit booms.  Regional governments should therefore 
ensure that adequate supervisory and prudential controls are in place and maintained after the 
opening of the capital account.   
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Table 4: The Impact of Macroeconomic Policy Shocks on the Emergence of Credit Booms 
 Dependent Variable = Credit Booms 
Variable Basic 
Regression 
Equation 
Lending 
Rate 
Deposit 
Rate 
Spread Changes 
in Money 
Supply 
Government 
Consumption 
Trade 
Openness 
Financial 
Openness 
Constant -0.145 
(-0.359) 
-0.122 
(-0.274) 
-0.225 
(-0.470) 
0.040 
(0.094) 
-0.172 
(-0.407) 
-0.242 
(-0.320) 
0.381 
(0.678) 
-0.209 
(-0.553) 
tInflation  
-8.330 
(-2.035)** 
-1.765 
(-0.433) 
-1.171 
(-0.284) 
-1.272 
(-0.319) 
-5.609 
(-1.346) 
-8.452 
(-2.080)** 
-8.980 
(-
2.272)** 
-7.662 
(-1.902)* 
tcapitaperGDPinGrowth  
5.875 
(3.103)* 
3.969 
(1.431) 
4.074 
(1.461) 
4.100 
(1.488) 
3.343 
(1.071) 
6.029 
(1.888)* 
6.508 
(2.186)** 
4.878 
(1.560) 
tInvestment  
0.022 
(3.262)** 
0.015 
(2.319)** 
0.013 
(2.557)** 
0.015 
(2.875)** 
0.024 
(3.479)** 
0.023 
(2.612)** 
0.025 
(3.724)** 
0.025 
(3.637)** 
tGDPM 2  
-0.007 
(-2.126)** 
-0.006 
(-
2.164)** 
-0.006 
(-
2.196)** 
-0.006 
(-
2.416)** 
-0.010 
(-
2.351)** 
-0.007 
(-2.015)** 
-0.008 
(-
2.076)** 
-0.007 
(-
2.053)** 
tLending Rate  - 0.007 
(0.463) 
- - - - - - 
tDeposit Rate  - - 0.022 
(0.915) 
- - - - - 
tSpread  
- - - -0.014 
(-0.597) 
- - - - 
tChanges in Money  - - - - 2.030 
(1.620)* 
- - - 
tGovernment Consumption  - - - - - 0.005 
(0.165) 
- - 
tTrade Openness  - - - - - - -0.661 
(-1.295) 
- 
tCapital Account Openness  - - - - - - - 0.122 
(1.661)* 
         
Log-Likelihood -162.202 -149.355 -140.551 -140.644 -158.287 -162.198 -161.902 -161.810 
McFadden R-squared 0.107 0.163 0.175 0.188 0.171 0.113 0.149 0.095 
Number of Observations 96 86 80 80 92 96 96 96 
Note: (1) z-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
(2) ** and * indicates significance at the 5 and 10 percent level of testing,  
     respectively 
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6.3 Political Cycle, External Shocks and Credit Booms 
The final group of potential determinants of credit booms attempt to measure the effects of 
political and other exogenous factors on the emergence of credit booms; the coefficients are 
summarised in Table 5.  In terms of elections, the political business cycle, proxied by an elections 
dummy had a statistically insignificant impact.  This result could imply that its effects may 
already be accounted for in the inflation and growth variables.   
 
Surprisingly, world growth was negative and significantly correlated with the emergence of credit 
booms.  This result could reflect the increased demand on bank finances that arise during 
economic downturns.  Similarly, capital flows were negatively associated with the emergence of 
credit booms, suggesting that capital flows may be acting as a substitute for bank finance.  The 
final external shock variable, changes in the terms of trade, had a statistically insignificant impact 
on the emergence of credit booms.  This result may suggest that during positive terms of trade 
shocks firms may depend more on internal finance. 
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Table 5: The Impact of External Shocks on the Emergence of Credit Booms 
 Dependent Variable = Credit Booms 
Variable Basic 
Regression 
Equation 
World 
Growth 
Capital 
Inflows 
Change 
Terms of 
Trade 
Elections 
Constant -0.145 
(-0.359) 
0.445 
(0.981) 
-0.093 
(-0.225) 
-0.055 
(-0.146) 
-0.120 
(-0.279) 
tInflation  
-8.330 
(-2.035)** 
-10.255 
(-2.237)** 
-4.775 
(-1.276) 
-4.088 
(-1.042) 
-8.376 
(-2.044)** 
tcapitaperGDPinGrowth  
5.875 
(3.103)* 
9.112 
(2.338)** 
5.665 
(1.902)* 
5.472 
(1.886)* 
5.871 
(1.883)* 
tInvestment  
0.022 
(3.262)** 
0.020 
(3.135)** 
0.016 
(2.741)** 
0.016 
(2.435)** 
0.022 
(3.294)** 
tGDPM 2  
-0.007 
(-2.126)** 
-0.005 
(-1.817)* 
-0.007 
(-2.454)** 
-0.006 
(-2.179)** 
-0.007 
(-2.041)** 
tGrowthWorld  
- -0.247 
(-1.939)* 
- - - 
tFlowsCapital  
- - -0.026 
(-2.058)** 
- - 
tTradeofTerms  
- - - 0.178 
(0.327) 
- 
tElections  
- - - - -0.026 
(-0.148) 
      
Log-Likelihood -162.202 -161.449 -131.144 -154.305 -162.197 
R-squared 0.107 0.077 0.285 0.200 0.104 
Number of Observations 96 96 76 89 96 
Note: (1) z-Statistics are given in parentheses. 
(2) ** and * indicates significance at the 5 and 10 percent level of testing,  
     respectively 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
An effective and vibrant financial system can have a positive impact on long run economic 
growth (see Levine (1997).  However, a sharp jump in credit, known as a credit boom, can have 
quite deleterious effects.  Such booms usually finance investment in high-risk assets as well as 
finance an acceleration in consumption expenditure.  By stoking inflationary pressures, these two 
factors often increase financial sector fragility and at the limit lead to balance of payments and/or 
financial crisis (see Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Borio and Lowe, 2002).  
 
This study employs a panel count data regression approach to model the factors that have 
historically led to the emergence of credit booms and conversely busts in the Caribbean.  Three 
key groups of variables are considered: (1) macroeconomic developments; (2) macroeconomic 
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policy and (3) external shocks.  The reported results suggest that macroeconomic developments 
were the main determinants of credit booms in the Caribbean, with low inflation, high growth in 
GDP per capita, investment booms as well as less developed financial systems leading to the 
emergence of credit booms.  In relation to external shocks, the two key factors here were world 
growth and capital inflations.  In terms of policy responses to credit booms the study finds that 
changes in the money supply and opening the capital account can have the most significant 
impact on the emergence of booms in the region.  The estimated model results indicate that loose 
monetary policy and capital account liberalisation are significantly correlated with the emergence 
of credit booms in the region. 
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Table A1: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
Credit Credit to the non-financial 
private sector (US$ Millions) 
divided by the GDP deflator 
IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics and the United 
Nation’s National Accounts 
Database 
GDP per capita Real GDP ($US Millions) 
divided by population 
United Nation’s National 
Accounts Database 
GDP growth Log change in real GDP per 
capita 
Authors’ Calculations 
Inflation Change in GDP deflator United Nation’s National 
Accounts Database 
Investment Gross fixed capital formation 
as a percentage of GDP 
” 
M2GDP Money plus quasi-money 
(US$ Millions) as a ratio to 
nominal GDP (US$ Millions) 
IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics and the United 
Nation’s National Accounts 
Database 
Lending rate Lending rate IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics 
Deposit rate Deposit rate IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics 
Interest rate spread Difference between lending 
and deposit rates 
Authors’ calculations 
Changes in money Log change in money IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics 
Government consumption Government consumption as a 
percentage of GDP 
United Nation’s National 
Accounts Database 
Trade Openness Exports plus imports as a 
percentage of GDP 
United Nation’s National 
Accounts Database 
Capital Account Openness Index of capital account 
openness 
Chi and Ito (200x) 
World growth Annual change in world GDP United Nation’s National 
Accounts Database 
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Capital flows Balance on the financial 
account as a percentage of 
GDP 
IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics 
Terms of trade Log change in the ratio of 
export and import prices 
United Nation’s National 
Accounts Database 
Elections Takes a value of 1 if election 
occurs in year t 
Political Database of the 
Americas 
(http://pdba.georgetown.edu/) 
 
 
